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JURY-Trial Judge's Inquiry into Numerical Division of
Jury: State v. Rickerson

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Rickerson, I the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
trial court judge's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury did not
2
per se constitute reversible error or a violation of due process. The
Rickerson court thereby reversed the New Mexico Court of Appeals'
recent holding in State v. Aragon.3 In Aragon, the court of appeals held
that any inquiry into the numerical division of jurors is reversible error.
4
The Aragon court based its decision on previous New Mexico cases. It
5
also relied on Brasfield v. United States, stating that Brasfield held that
such an inquiry was error because it violated due process. 6 Contrary to
the Aragon decision, the Rickerson court applied the view held in the
majority of states that the Brasfield ruling was an exercise of the United
States Supreme Court's supervisory powers over lower federal courts,
and thus did not involve substantive constitutional principles that were
binding on the states. 7 This Note will address the rationale for the Rickerson decision and the possible ramifications of the holding which reversed earlier New Mexico case law and retreated to a rule dictating a
case-by-case consideration of the issue.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In State v. Rickerson, the defendant was charged with criminal sexual
penetration of a minor.' At trial, the court instructed the jury on both this
1. 95 N.M. 666, 625 P.2d 1183 (1981).
2. Id. at 668, 625 P.2d at 1185. For a discussion of this case from another viewpoint, see Schowers,
Constitutional Law, Survey of New Mexico Law: 1980-81, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 191, 218 (1982).
3. 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284 (1976). In
Aragon, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction for heroin trafficking,
remanding the case for a new trial. It stated that the judge's polling of the jury, combined',vith a
later shotgun instruction, were grounds for reversal. See infra text accompanying notes 71-83.
4. State v. Cranford, 83 N.M. 294, 491 P.2d 511 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972);
State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 321 P.2d 202 (1958); Pirch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 80 N.M.
323, 455 P.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1969); State v. Minns, 80 N.M. 269, 454 P.2d 355 (Ct. App. 1969).
5. 272 U.S. 448 (1926).
6. In Brasfield, the United States Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
that a judge's inquiry into the numerical split of the jury was reversible error. Id. at 450. The Court
did not explicitly say that the inquiry was a violation of due process guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 38-40.
7. 95 N.M. at 668, 625 P.2d at 1185.
8. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11 (1978) (first, second, or third degree felony depending on the
circumstances) and N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 9.40 to 9.60 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
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crime and the lesser included offense of criminal sexual contact of a
minor.9 The jury deliberated for several hours, took four or five votes,
and then notified the trial judge that it could not agree on a verdict. The
judge reassembled the jurors in the courtroom and asked the foreman to
tell him, without indicating which number was for conviction, how the
voting had gone.' 0
The foreman informed the judge that the first vote on the greater charge
of criminal sexual penetration had been three to nine. " The foreman also
told the judge that the jury did not believe it could reach a unanimous
verdict on the lesser included offense of criminal sexual contact. 2 After
asking the foreman to reconfirm that there was no unanimous vote on
either charge, the judge asked what the last vote was in numbers, cautioning the foreman not to indicate which way the vote had gone. 13
The foreman responded that the vote was ten to two. The court then
asked, "And you are telling me that no matter what you do, there is no
way you are going to be able to reach a unanimous verdict on any of the
three forms?"' 4 In a short interchange at the bench, the judge told counsel
for both parties that his inclination was to send the jury back; that "it
was too bad [he] couldn't get [his] shotgun instruction"; 5 and that he
would send the jury home in an hour or two and consider a mistrial motion
if the situation had not changed. 6 The trial judge then told the jury: "The
court is going to let you retire to the jury room again; and that's about
all I want to say at this time. The jury will retire."' 7
Approximately two hours later, the jury returned with a verdict. It
found the defendant guilty of the lesser offense, criminal sexual contact
of a minor."8 Jusf before the announcement of the verdict, the defense
moved for a mistrial because of the court's inquiry and the additional
instruction to return to the jury room. 9 The trial court denied the motion,
9. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-9-12 (Cum. Supp. 1982) (fourth degree felony or misdemeanor
depending on the circumstances) and N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 9.20 to 9.38, (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
10. 95 N.M. at 667, 625 P.2d at 1184.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Record at 275, State v. Rickerson.
14. Id. Depending on its verdict, the jury could fill out a form for either the greater or lesser
offense, or a form indicating the defendant was not guilty of the crimes charged.
15. Id. at 281. A shotgun instruction is an instruction which "appears to be directed on the
members of the jury who hold a minority view. It is designed to pressure the minority jurors into
changing their minds." State v. Minns, 80 N.M. 269, 273, 454 P.2d 355, 359 (Ct. App. 1969). See
discussion of Minns, infra at text accompanying note 75. See also Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.
492, 501 (1896); N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 50.30 (Repl. Pamp. 1982); and discussion of State v. Aragon,
infra at text accompanying notes 71-83.
16. Record at 281, State v. Rickerson.
17. 95 N.M. at667, 625 P.2d at 1184.
18. Record at281, State v. Rickerson.
19. 95 N.M. at667, 625 P.2d at1884.
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stating that New Mexico case law required that the court determine whether
the jury had found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense before
the jury made a decision on the lesser offense. 2" The court felt that it was
obligated to determine whether the jury had reached unanimous agreement
on any count to protect the defendant from double jeopardy. 2' Both New
Mexico procedural rules22 and case law23 indicate that when a jury cannot
reach unanimous agreement on a whole case, the judge should poll the
jury on its decisions on the greater offense and any lesser included offenses. This poll protects the defendant from double jeopardy in a situation
where the jury cannot reach unanimous agreement on the whole case but
unanimously agrees to acquit the defendant on one or more degrees of
the offense. 24
Rickerson appealed his conviction to the court of appeals, alleging that
the trial court made three errors.25 Rickerson's third point of error, the
only point within the scope of this Note, challenged the trial court's
inquiry into the numerical division of the jury. In a memorandum opinion,
the court of appeals reversed the lower court and found that the inquiry
had violated Rickerson's right to substantive due process. 2 6 The court of
appeals cited both Aragon and Brasfield as authority for its position that
any inquiry into the numerical split of the jury is a violation of due

process. 27

20. Record at 281, State v. Rickerson.
21. Id.
22. N.M. R. Crim. P. 44(d) reads as follows:
(d) Conviction of lesseroffense. If so instructed, the jury may find the defendant
guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt
to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein.
If the jury has been instructed on one or more lesser included offenses, and the
jury cannot unanimously agree upon any of the offenses submitted, the court shall
poll the jury by inquiring as to each degree of the offense upon which the jury
has been instructed beginning with the highest degree and, in descending order,
inquiring as to each lesser degree until the court has determined at what level of
the offense the jury has disagreed. If upon a poll of the jury it is determined that
the jury has unanimously voted not guilty as to any degree of the offense, a
verdict of not guilty shall be entered for that degree and for each greater degree
of the offense.
23. See, e.g., O'Kelly v. State, 94 N.M. 74, 607 P.2d 612 (1980), in which the New Mexico
Supreme Court discussed N.M. R. Crim. P. 44. In O'Kelly, the court held that the trial court's
refusal to grant defendant's demand for a jury poll did not violate defendant's constitutional right
against double jeopardy. There was no lesser included offense involved in O'Kelly; therefore, N.M.
R. Crim. P. 44(d) did not apply. The case did, however, discuss the fact that in cases where a lesser
included offense is charged and the jury cannot unanimously agree on any of the offenses submitted,
N.M. R. Crim. P. 44(d) mandates a poll.
24. O'Kelly v. State, 94 N.M. at 75, 607 P.2d at 613.
25. 95 N.M. at 667, 625 P.2d at 1184.
26. State v. Rickerson (N.M. Ct. App., filed Nov. 13, 1980) (mem.) (unpublished).
27. Id.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether,
under the facts of the Rickerson case, "an inquiry by the trial court limited
to the numerical division of the jury violates due process." 28 This court
reversed the court of appeals decision, holding that there was no violation
of due process.29

DISCUSSION
The Court's Rationalefor Reversal
Aragon had stated that Brasfield established a constitutional principle.
In reversing the court of appeals and in overruling Aragon, the New
Mexico Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of Brasfield. Because
it read Brasfield to establish only a procedural rule for federal courts, the
court decided that Brasfield was not binding on state courts. In addition,
the supreme court said that in the interest of judicial efficiency it was
returning to the established rule in the state concerning the question of
judicial inquiry into the numerical split of the jury.3° The court said that
under State v. Nelson3 and Pirch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,3 2 the

rule provided that "convictions would be reversed if the cumulative effect
of the trial court's actions had a coercive effect on the jury."3 3
The Conflict Before and After Brasfield
In order to understand the supreme court's reversal of the court of
appeals and the conflicting readings of Brasfield in the two opinions,
Brasfield's prior and subsequent history should be examined. The contradictory interpretations of the Brasfield holding by the New Mexico
appellate courts in their Rickerson opinions mirror the conflicts in decisions in other state and federal jurisdictions. Brasfield itself was preceded
by inconsistencies in earlier federal decisions concerning a judge's inquiry
into the numerical division of a jury and its due process implications.
Prior to Brasfield, the Supreme Court's dicta in Burton v. United States34
had criticized the practice. The Court said that the judge's inquiry into
28. 95 N.M. at 667, 625 P.2d at 1184.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 63 N.M. 428, P.2d 202 (1958).
32. 80 N.M. 323, 455 P.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1969).
33. 95 N.M. at 667, 625 P.2d at 1184.
34. 196 U.S. 283 (1905). In Burton, a United States senator had been accused of violating a
United States criminal statute which prohibited United States senators from receiving compensation
for services rendered before any government proceeding in which the United States was involved.
At trial, the jury deliberated for thirty-six hours without reaching agreement. When the jury returned
to the courtroom, the judge asked for the numerical division. After the foreman told him that the
jury stood eleven to one, the judge charged the jury with its duty to agree if possible and directed
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the proportion of the jury's division was a practice "not to be commended." 35 The Court stated that although the charge to the jury to
endeavor fairly and honestly to agree was appropriate, "we do not think
that the administration of the law requires such knowledge or permits
such a question on the part of the presiding judge. "36 After Burton, federal
courts reached different decisions as to whether the Burton condemnation
of a trial judge's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury was an
admonishment or a prohibition37 .
In Brasfield, the government charged the defendants with conspiracy
to possess and transport intoxicating liquors in violation of the National
Prohibition Act. When the jury failed to agree after "some hours of
deliberation," the judge inquired into the numerical split of the jury.3 8
The foreman informed the court that the split was nine to three, without
indicating which number favored conviction.3 9 On appeal from the conviction, the United States Supreme Court reversed, saying: "[W]e deem
it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial, that the inquiry
itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. "I Brasfield did not
indicate whether the Supreme Court intended the rule to be a constitutional
rule, binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment, or whether
the Court was only exercising its supervisory powers over the federal
courts. The court did not explicitly refer to the fourteenth amendment,
nor did it state that a constitutional violation had occurred.
Although Brasfield's prohibition of numerical inquiries is a firmly established rule in the federal courts, 4' there is a sharp division among the
state courts over the basis for the Brasfield holding and the coercive
nature of the numerical inquiry alone. 2 In State v. Aragon," New Mexico
explicitly adopted the Brasfield rule as a constitutional provision. Michigan also adopted the Brasfield rule, and it is arguable that it found the
the panel to retire and make a serious attempt to arrive at a verdict. On appeal from a conviction,
the United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that it was reversible error for the trial judge not
to deliver the jury additional charges which the defendant had requested.
35. Id. at 307.
36. Id. at 308.
37. Compare Quong Duck v. United States, 293 F. 563 (9th Cir. 1923) (asking jurors how they
are divided not necessarily prejudicial error) and Bemal v. United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917),
cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918) (supplemental charge after judge inquired into jury division not
error) with Nigro v. United States, 4 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1925) (asking jury which had failed to agree
whether there was a predominance one way or another was prejudicial error) and St. Louis &
S.F.R.R. v. Bishard, 147 F. 496 (8th Cir. 1906) (not permissible to inquire of unagreed jury how
they are divided numerically).
38. 272 U.S. at 449.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 450.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979).
42. See Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 769, 780, 794 (1977).
43. 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574 (Ct. App.), cert. denied. 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284 (1976).
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Brasfield holding to be a constitutional decision." The majority of state
court decisions dealing with the propriety 'of such an inquiry have not
followed the Brasfield rule.4 5 These courts have found "no error, or at
the most harmless error ' in such an inquiry by itself. They have examined the trial judge's actions in relation to the "totality of the surrounding circumstances"" in order to decide whether there was any
coercion prejudicial to the defendant. Some state courts have specifically
rejected the Brasfield rule, interpreting it to be a rule of procedure adopted
by the Supreme Court for the lower federal courts. 48 Holding that Brasfield
did not mandate strict state court observance of the Brasfield rule, these
state courts have decided that they are "free to develop their own rules
concerning the propriety of judicial inquiry into a jury's division. " 4 9 Some
courts have approved of the practice as a reasonable way to determine
whether agreement among the jurors is probable.5" Other courts have
disapproved of the inquiry, but do not find it to be reversible error.'
In holding that Brasfield was not based on constitutional principles,
and in overruling Aragon, New Mexico joined the majority of states
which had already interpreted Brasfield as not binding on the states. 2
44. See People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193 (1973). In Wilson, the Supreme
Court of Michigan adopted the reasoning of the Michigan Court of Appeals when it had reviewed
the same case. The lower appellate court cited Brasfield and adopted the "Brasfield rule." The court
described the rule as stating that the inquiry "had a tendency to be coercive, and constituted error."
390 Mich. at 691, 213 N.W.2d at 195. Like Brasfield, the Wilson courts did not explicitly say that
a violation of a constitutional right had occurred.
45. See Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 769, 780, 794 (1977), for a discussion of the division over Brasfield
in the state courts. To support its decision that Brasfield involved only a procedural ruling, the
Rickerson court cited Cornell v. Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044, 1047 (8th Cir. 1980); Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d
1195 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979); People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 80, 442 P.2d
353, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1968); Lowe v. People, 175 Colo. 491, 488 P.2d 559 (1971); Muhammad
v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 254 S.E.2d 356 (1979); People v. Kirk, 76 I11.App. 3d 459, 394 N.E.2d
1212 (1979), cert..denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980); State v. Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978); State v. Smith, 431 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1968); Gov't of Virgin
Islands v. Romain, 600 F.2d at 435 (3d Cir. 1979).
46. Comment, Criminal Procedure-Ellis v. Reed: Constitutionality of Judicial Inquiry into Numerical Division of Jury, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 379, 385 (1980).
47. Id. at 386.
254 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1979); Wilson v.
48. See, e.g., Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, -,
State, 145 Ga. App. 315, 324-25, 244 S.E.2d 355, 362 (1978); State v. Comell, 266 N.W.2d 15,
19 (Iowa), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978); Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976);
State v. Morris, 476 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo. 1971); State v. Boogaard, 90 Wash. 2d 773, -. , 585
P.2d 789, 792 (1978); cf. Marsh v. Cupp, 392 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (D. Or. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d
1287 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 981 (1976) (habeas corpus petition).
49. Comment, supra note 46, at 386.
50. See, e.g., People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 810, 815, 442 P.2d 353, 356, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300
(1968) (en banc); Frazier v. State, 93 Ga. App. 204, 204, 91 S.E.2d 85, 85 (1956); Sharplin v.
State, 330 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976); State v. Baker, 293 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Mo. 1956); Joyner
v. State, 484 P.2d 560, 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
51. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Anthony, 91 Pa. Super. 518 (1927). State v. Middleton, 218
S.C. 452, 63 S.E.2d 163 (1951) applied the Brasfield rule if the jury also reveals its division
regarding conviction/acquittal to the trial judge, after he makes an inquiry into their numerical split.
52. See supra note 45.
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The Rickerson opinion cited several federal and state opinions, and quoted
a recent Eighth Circuit case to support its position that Brasfield is not
binding:
When read in the light of the rationale suggested in Burton, we think
the rule in Brasfield is more easily understood, not as an announcement of a mandatory principle of substantive constitutional doctrine,
but as an administrative admonition to the lower federal courts based
upon carefully considered notions of sound judicial practice.53
The court then "reaffirmed" the Nelson-Pirch rule that "such inquiries
are reversible error only when shown to have a coercive effect on the
jury.

,54

The Nelson-PirchRule
According to the Rickerson opinion, Nelson and Pirch set out a threepart test to determine whether the judge's actions are coercive when he
makes inquiries about the jury split:
The factors considered in determining if a court's inquiry was coercive under the Nelson-Pirch rule were: (a) whether any additional
instruction or instructions, especially a shotgun instruction, were
given; (b) whether the court failed to caution a jury not to surrender
honest convictions, thus pressuring holdout jurors to conform; and
(c) whether the court established time limits on further deliberations
with the threat of mistrial.55
Although neither Nelson nor Pirch actually listed the three factors described by the Rickerson court as the "Nelson-Pirch test," the factors
are considered in these decisions. Neither Nelson nor Pirch, however,
actually stated that these were the only factors which a court should weigh
in reviewing a trial judge's inquiry to the jury concerning its numerical
division.
State v. Nelson
State v. Nelson5 6 involved a charge of first-degree murder. After the
jury had deliberated for more than seven hours, the trial court inquired
into the numerical division of the jury."7 The foreman answered that the
jury was divided eleven to one. The judge then reminded the jury that
on voir dire each member had answered that he was not opposed to capital
53. 95 N.M. at 668, 625 P.2d at 1185 (quoting Cornell v. Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044, 1047 (8th Cir.
1980)).
54. 95 N.M. at 668, 625 P.2d at 1185.
55. Id. at 667, 625 P.2d at 1184.
56. 63 N.M. 428, 321 P.2d 202 (1958).
57. Id. at 431, 321 P.2d at 203.
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punishment in the proper case.58 The jury ultimately found the defendant
guilty of first-degree murder." The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the trial judge's repeated reminders to the jury concerning
statements on voir dire were coercive and therefore made in error. The
court stated that "any one of these statements made by the court, which
could have affected one juror only, was error. "I Thus, in its reversal of
Nelson's conviction, the supreme court considered what the Rickerson
court would later say was the first factor of the Nelson-Pirch test.
Pirch v. Firestone Rubber & Tire Co.
Pirch v. Firestone Rubber & Tire Co.6 was a products liability case
in which the jury reported that it was hopelessly deadlocked after five
hours of deliberations.6 2 The judge reassembled the jury in the courtroom
and inquired into its numerical division, instructing the foreman not to
disclose whether the votes were for or against any particular side.6 3 When
the foreman responded that the vote was five to seven and that it had
been that way for two hours, the judge reminded the jury that the trial
had been important, expensive, and lengthy. He then asked if the jury
might reach a decision after further deliberation. The judge told the jurors
to raise their hands if they believed the foreman's statement that a decision
could be reached in two or three hours. When eleven jurors affirmed the
foreman's statement, the judge set a time limit of an hour and a half for
further deliberation. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the
defendant appealed.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision
and found that the trial judge's statements to the jury along with the
imposition of a time limit for deliberation had a "cumulative effect of
• . . coerci[on]." 64 In reaching this decision, the court of appeals noted

that the judge failed to advise the panel that no juror should surrender
his conscientious conviction for the sake of agreement. The court of
appeals decision therefore implicitly rested on all three factors of what
the Rickerson court would later call the Nelson-Pirch test.
Earlier New Mexico Cases
The Rickerson opinion cited earlier New Mexico cases which addressed
the question whether inquiry into the numerical divisions of a jury is
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 429, 321 P.2d at 203.
Id. at 433, 321 P.2d at 205.
80 N.M. 323, 455 P.2d 189 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 316, 454 P.2d 973 (1969).
Id. at 325, 455 P.2d at 191.
Id.
Id. at 328, 455 P.2d at 192.
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reversible error. These cases did not mention the three-factor test either.
State v. McCarter65 was a murder case in which the jury found the defendant guilty. On appeal, the court held that reversible error occurred
when the jury sent a note to the judge that it was divided eleven to one,
and the judge responded with a note urging further deliberations. The
court noted that the defendant was absent during the receipt and transmission of the two notes, and that there was no substantial evidence to
66
overcome the presumption that the verdict was affected by the note.
McCarterthus set out another factor not mentioned in Rickerson: whether
the defendant was present when a communication between a judge and
a jury occurred. McCarter stated that a presumption of prejudice arises
if such a communication takes place in the absence of the accused; the
state must demonstrate on appeal that the communication did not affect
the verdict. 67
In State v. Turner,61 the court of appeals upheld the defendant's conviction of rape and aggravated burglary even though the judge had asked
the jury foreman to tell him the numerical split of the jury. The Turner
court noted that the case was tried before State v. Aragon, "which disapproved of such an inquiry."' 69 The court further reasoned that a timely
objection to the error had not been made by the defense, and that the
"magnitude of error" found in Nelson and Pirch was not present in
Turner.70
The Overruled Decision in State v. Aragon
Although the Rickerson court stated that the State v. Aragon7 decision
was based on the Nelson-Pirch three-factor test, 2 it appears that the
Rickerson court was the first to delineate it. In Aragon, the court of
appeals reversed a conviction for heroin trafficking. In remanding the
case for a new trial, the court discussed the "coercive conduct by the
trial [judgel" who had inquired into the numerical division of the jury
and had issued an additional "shotgun" instruction five and a half hours
later.73
65. 93 N.M. 708, 604 P.2d 1242 (1980).
66. Id. at 711, 604 P.2d at 1245.
67. Id.
68. 90 N.M. 79, 559 P.2d 1206 (Ct. App. 1977).
69. Id. at 83, 559 P.2d at 1210.
the error was not as great inmagnitude
statement that
70. Id. The court did not elaborate on its
judge
as the error was inNelson or Pirch. InTurner, however, the supreme court noted that the trial
made the inquiry, but, apparently, he gave no additional instructions. The supreme court may have
considered the lack of an additional potentially coercive instruction.
71. 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284 (1976).
72. 95 N.M. at667, 625 P.2d at1184.
73. The shotgun instruction was worded inpart as follows:
[Aind ifthe larger number of your panel are for conviction, a dissenting juror
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In State v. Cranford,14 the New Mexico Supreme Court had approved
of the shotgun instruction, despite the court of appeals' criticism of the
same kind of instruction in State v. Minns.75 Because of the Cranford
decision that the shotgun instruction was not reversible error, the Aragon
court could not consider the additional instruction "standing alone" to be
error.76 It therefore considered the instruction in relation to the trial court's
inquiry into the numerical division of the jurors and in light of the Nelson
and Pirchdecisions. The Aragon court highlighted the language in Nelson
which said that the judge's reminder to the jury of its statements concerning capital punishment at voir dire "became a lecture to the one juror
as to his duty to consider the attitude of the eleven as to first-degree
murder." 77 The Aragon court noted that the instruction could have had
no influence on the eleven jurors, and it cited the statement in Nelson
that any one of the trial court's statements which could have affected
only one juror was error.78 In its discussion of Pirch, the Aragon court
set out the actions of the Pirch trial court and stated that they had a
"cumulative effect of . . .coercion."79
In State v. Aragon, the court of appeals noted that the jury had been
deliberating for several hours. It found that the judge's shotgun instruction
after his inquiry into the jury's numerical split was in effect a lecture to
one juror. It observed that a verdict was reached twenty-five minutes after
the instruction was given. "[Ihis combination of circumstances" amounted
should consider whether a doubt in his own mind is a reasonable one that makes
no impression on the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent,
with himself, who have heard the same evidence, with the same attention, with
an equal desire to arrive at the truth, and under the sanction of the same oath.
89 N.M. at 96, 547 P.2d at 579.
74. 83 N.M. 294, 491 P.2d 511 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972). The court held in
part that the use of a shotgun instruction was not prejudicial error in the defendant's first-degree
murder conviction.
75. 80 N.M. 269, 454 P.2d 355 (Ct. App. 1969). In Minns, the defendant was convicted, under
N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-9-9 (1953), of having indecently handled and touched a girl under the age
of sixteen. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court committed reversible error in giving
an additional shotgun instruction. The court of appeals stated that, in its opinion, "the instruction
given is so worded as to be excessively coercive." Id. at 273, 454 P.2d at 359. However, in accordance
with the New Mexico Supreme Court's decisions that such charges were not improper, the court of
appeals said, "[W]e are not free to hold the trial court erred in using the instruction." Id.
76. 89 N.M. at 97, 547 P.2d at 579.
77. id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 96, 547 P.2d at 579. In its discussion of Pirch, the Aragon court set out the acts of
the Pirch trial court:
In Pirch the trial court (1) inquired as to how the jurors were numerically divided,
(2) gave an additional instruction without cautioning jurors not to surrender their
honest convictions in order to arrive at a verdict, and (3) imposed a time limit
on further deliberations with the threat of a mistrial if a verdict was not reached
within that time limit.
89 N.M. at 96, 547 P.2d at 579. Obviously, the Rickerson court must have looked at this language
when it formulated the Nelson-Pirch test.
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to reversible error.8" The court then quoted the United States Supreme
Court's statement in Brasfield v. United States concerning judicial inquiry
into the numerical division of the jury: " 'We deem it essential to the
fair and impartial conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should be
regarded as ground for reversal.' "8 The court of appeals reasoned that
the inquiry was a violation of due process under the Brasfield rule because
the error affected the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial .82
Because the Brasfield rule had rarely been noted "by either courts or
counsel in New Mexico," the court of appeals gave its decision prospective application."
In its Rickerson opinion, the court of appeals simply followed its own
dictates concerning the prospective application of the Brasfield rule. 84
Unlike Aragon, this memorandum opinion did not cite any combination
of circumstances which made the inquiry reversible error. Rather, it cited
Aragon and Brasfield and held that the inquiry was itself a violation of
due process which required a reversal of the trial court's conviction.8 5 In
reversing Rickerson and overruling Aragon, the supreme court explained
that these previous decisions had actually been based on the Nelson-Pirch
test, despite the explicit language in the two opinions that the holdings
were based on constitutional considerations.
Questions Unanswered by Rickerson
The Rickerson court did not state how many factors of the NelsonPirch test must come into play before reversible error is committed. It
did not adopt the "totality of surrounding circumstances" test that other
state courts have used in deciding this question.8 6 It also did not state
other factors that might be considered to determine whether a judge's
question to a jury about its numerical split was impermissibly coercive.
The Rickerson court failed to explain its finding that there was no
coercion in this situation, even though one, and arguably two, of the
Nelson-Pirch factors were met. First, the trial judge in Rickerson had
mentioned his wish to use a shotgun instruction in his discussion at the
bench. It is at least arguable that the judge communicated his exasperation
to the jury by his manner when he addressed them. Trial records cannot
preserve the intimidating tone of seemingly uncoercive words. Second,
the trial judge did not caution the jury to not give up any honest convictions. The third factor was not present, however, because the judge did
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 97, 547 P.2d at 580.
Id.
89 N.M. at 97, 547 P.2d at 580.
Id.
State v. Rickerson (N.M. Ct. App., filed Nov. 13, 1980) (mem.) (unpublished).
Id.
See discussion of totality of circumstances test supra at text accompanying note 47.
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not set a time limit for jury deliberations. Although the Rickerson court
set out a test to be used for future appellate considerations of a trial court's
inquiry into the numerical division of a jury, it did not explain how an
appellate court should evaluate the test. One might infer from the Rickerson opinion that all three factors must be present for reversal or appeal,
or that the setting of a time limit by the trial judge is the necessary factor,
because this factor alone was not met in the Rickerson trial.
Reasons for the Return to the Nelson-PirchRule
The Rickerson court buttressed its decision with concerns for judicial
efficiency. Although it said that a judge's inquiry into the numerical
division of a jury "was not to be encouraged," 87 it justified "inquiries
as to probability of agreement" when it was done to "ensure that a verdict
is reached or to determine whether further deliberations are needed or if
the jury should be discharged."" The court noted that such an inquiry
might be necessary to protect the defendant from double jeopardy consequences when more than one count is presented to the jury, as was the
situation in Rickerson.8 9 Even if the jury had not reached a verdict on
the whole case, the judge was obligated to find out if the jury had voted
to acquit the defendant on any of the charges.' The opinion cited Ellis
v. Reed 9' to support its assertion that the inquiry per se is not coercive,
"since the jury is already well aware of its numerical split. "92
In considering this question, the New Mexico Supreme Court ignored
the specific finding in Brasfield that such judicial inquiry invades the
province and sanctity of the jury deliberation process, thereby affecting
the proper relation of the court to the jury.93 The Rickerson court said
there was "some justification" for the inquiry to help the court determine
if further deliberations were necessary or if the jury should be discharged. 94 There is no suggestion in the Rickerson opinion as to why the
trial court should be allowed to use a potentially coercive method of
interrogating the jury when equally effective and less coercive methods
87. 95 N.M. at668, 625 P.2d at1185.
88. Id.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
90. 95 N.M. at668, 625 P.2d at1185.
91. 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1979). InEllis, the defendant was convicted for embezzling in a
North Carolina state court. No error in the trial was found on direct appeal. Discretionary review
was denied by the state supreme court. At trial, the judge had inquired into the numerical division
of the jury and had given a supplemental shotgun instruction. Appellant argued that Brasfield
prohibited the inquiry. The Ellis court held that Brasfield was intended to formulate policy for the
federal courts, not "destructive dogma against the states in the administration of their systems of
criminal justice." Id. at 1200 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952)).
92. 95 N.M. at668, 625 P.2d at1185.
93. 272 U.S. at450.
94. 95 N.M. at668, 625 P.2d at1185.
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were available. The jury could be asked directly, without reference to its
numerical division, whether it thought that further deliberations would
be effective. The Rickerson court also justified the numerical inquiry to
avoid "double jeopardy consequences." 95 Both the language in N.M. R.
Crim. P. 44(d) 96 and the discussion of this rule in past case law97 suggest
that the poll of the jury takes places when the judge determines that the
jury is a hung jury, not when the judge intends to send it back for more
deliberation.
The Danger of Judicial Inquiry
Whether the ruling in Brasfield v. United States was a constitutional
decision or an exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over
the federal courts, the opinion still articulates the danger inherent in
permitting such judicial inquiry. The coercive nature of such an inquiry
is difficult to measure and prove during appellate review. Permitting the
practice allows a potential threat to due process and to the proper relationship between judge and jury. Michigan courts have articulately stated
that judicial inquiry into the numerical split of the jury always has improper and coercive effect. In People v. Wilson,98 the Michigan Supreme
Court reasoned:
Whenever the question of numerical division of a jury is asked from
the bench, in the context of an inquiry into the progress of deliberation, it carries the improper suggestion that the state of numerical
division reflects the state of deliberations. It has the doubly coercive
effect of melting the resistance of the minority and freezing the
determination of the majority."9
In People v. Lawson,"o the Michigan Court of Appeals elaborated on this
idea: "[sjuch an inquiry ... carries the improper suggestion that the
numerical division at the preliminary stage of deliberation is relevant to
what the final verdict will, or should be."l°t
The Rickerson court rejected the idea that such judicial inquiries are
always prejudicial without disproving this argument. It did not deal with
the possibility that judicial knowledge of the numerical split might influence the jurors to feel that the minority should side with the majority in
further deliberations. From this "improper starting point," the minority,
95. Id.
96. See supra note 23 for the text of N.M. R. Crim. P. 44(d).
97. See supra note 23.
98. 390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193 (1973). For a discussion of Wilson, see supra note 44.
99. Id. at 692, 213 N.W.2d at 195.
100. 56 Mich. App. 100, 223 N.W.2d 716 (1974).
101. Id. at 105, 223 N.W.2d at 719.
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"implicity rebuked by the judge," may adopt the position implicitly
approved by the judge. 02
In stating that inquiries into the numerical division of the jury are
reversible error "only when shown to have a coercive effect on the
jury,"' 0 3 the Rickerson court set out the three factors of the Nelson-Pirch
test, but did not elaborate on how the coercive effect on the jury was to
be proven. It appeared to reject the broader test of considering all the
circumstances. In Brasfield, the United States Supreme Court noted that
the degree of "improper influence on the jury" was "not measurable. "I'
The Rickerson court ignored the fact that in Brasfield the Supreme Court
stated that such an inquiry by a judge in itself tends to be coercive and
improperly influential on the jury.' The Rickerson court did not discuss
the possibility that "when the majority-minority is revealed to the court,
prejudice may result. "06The influence of the trial judge, "the powerful,
omniscient, judicial authority figure"' 0 7 can be extensive when he asks
to know the jury's division in numbers. Despite the fact that the court
allows the practice for the purposes of judicial efficiency, this permissiveness might have the opposite result. At least in some instances, permitting the inquiry on the trial level might require the appellate courts to
consider the question of coerciveness more often. Whatever judicial efficiency that is achieved by the allowance of the inquiry at trial might be
offset by the inefficiency of making the appellate courts evaluate each
case according to the Nelson-Pirch test.
CONCLUSION
In deciding that a trial judge's inquiry into the numerical split of a jury
did not by itself constitute reversible error, State v. Rickerson reversed
the holding in State v. Aragon. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed
with a majority of state courts that the holding in Brasfield v. United
States was not a constitutional decision and was therefore not binding on
state courts. Although the Rickerson court set out three factors to test
whether the circumstances had been prejudicial to an individual defendant
when such an inquiry had been made by a judge, the court did not state
how many of the factors had to be met for there to be a finding of reversible
error. State v. Rickerson put forth no justification to overcome the policy
reasons which support the prohibition of such an inquiry. The case pre102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Comment, supra note 46 at 390.
95 N.M. at 668, 625 P.2d at 1185.
272 U.S. at 450.
Id.
Comment, supra note 46, at 389.
Id.
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sented no justification for the implicit threat to the defendant's due process
rights and the potential hazard to the proper relationship between judge
and jury. It would be wise for the New Mexico Supreme Court to say
how courts should apply the Nelson-Pirchtest and why the inquiry should
be allowed when it flies in the face of the strong policies which argue
for its prohibition.
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